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"A drawing-room in Second Empire style. A massive bronze orna-
ment stands on the mantelpiece."1 With these two sentences, Jean-
Paul Sartre set the stage for his No Exit. Despite the fact that Hell
has "no need for red-hot pokers" since "Hell is-other people," it
nevertheless suited his vision that Hell be decorated after the tastes of
the Second Empire. The Second Empire, with its massive bronze
ornaments, stands as the perfect embodiment of grotesque bourgeois
taste. Whether or not Sartre viewed the Second Empire as a figure for
Vichy, with those two sentences he communicated a disdain for all
that was bourgeois and philistine. Thus, when the Philadelphia
Museum of Art produced its exhibition on Second Empire art in the
1970s, Jean-Marie Moulin wrote in the catalogue that had the exhibi-
tion "been proposed in France by Frenchmen it would have had great
difficulty seeing the light of day."2 Clearly, the regime of Louis Napo-
leon represented more punchline-"the second as farce"-than seri-
ous art.
Without reference to such images of art under Napoleon III, it is
difficult to analyze the west wing of the Palais de Justice, completed in
1868. It may be a temptation to approach the west wing de novo as a
* The author would like to thank Jan Albers and Matthew Truesdell for their contributions
to this book review.
1. JEAN-PAUL SARaRE, No Exrr AND THREE OTHER PLAys 3 (1955).
2. JEAN-MARIE MouLIN, THE SECOND EMPIRE: ART AND SOcIErY 11 (1978) (Catalogue for
the exhibit "The Second Empire 1852-1970: Art in France under Napoleon III" at the
Philadelphia Museum of Art).
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1920s British tourist family with a Blue Guide in hand that confidently
explained:
The handsome facade in the Place Dauphine, by Duc (1857-68), is
adorned with statues of Prudence and Truth by Dumont, Chas-
tisement and Protection by Jouffrey, and Strength and Justice by
Jalay. The lions flanking the steps in the center are by Isidore
Bonheur. The three bronze doors lead to the Vestibule de-
Harlay.3
Each element of the facade would appear to be a neutral ornament,
the artists' names entirely interchangeable to the tired tourists as they
followed the guide on to the Quai des Orf~vres and Sainte-Chapelle.
Rather than taking either of these two routes through the doors of
the Palais de Justice, Katherine Fischer Taylor begins her new book on
the Palais de Justice with a problematic. She opens her introduction
by explaining that "French justice was rarely talked about in the 19th
century without reference to the dramatic change from ancien r6gime
to modem justice, a change identified with the historic Palais de Jus-
tice, where French centralized justice had been founded centuries ear-
lier."4 Having situated the Palais de Justice at the core of the
nineteenth-century image of justice, Taylor moves on to articulate one
of the central questions of her book. She explains that the movement
from pre-revolutionary to post-revolutionary justice was accompanied
by a move from an ancien regime courtroom with its "rich decoration
and sculpted ceiling, display[ing] the icon, the king on his lit de justice
in the corner"5 to a courtroom "stripped for duty by the new Supreme
Court, which considered the early French Renaissance decor inappro-
priate for a courtroom ruled by an ideal of codified law."6 Taylor thus
sets up polarities in which "text replaces icon"7 and neoclassicism
replaces the sumptuous decor of the French Renaissance. Establish-
ing these polar opposites on either side of the revolution, Taylor views
the courtroom designed by Louis Duc as an odd reversal of the shift
brought about by the revolution. "Why," she queries, "readopt rich
decoration, which was explicitly associated with the vanished French
Renaissance decor of the chief courtroom?"8
Taylor poses this as a problem requiring explanation. But from the
start it should not be surprising to find that official architecture under
Napoleon III does not embody republican neoclassical virtue. After
all, the Second Empire represented a political compromise between
3. FINDLAY MUIRHEAD & MARCEL MONMARCH9, PARIS AND ITS ENVIRONS 98 (1922).
4. KATHERINE FISCHER TAYLOR, IN THE THEATER OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PALAIS DE
JUSTICE IN SECOND EMPIRE PARIS xvii (1993).
5. Id. at xvii-xviii.
6. Id. at xvii.
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republicanism and authority, promising order at the same time that it
claimed to be a continuation of the revolution. And Louis Napoleon
was himself full of ambiguities. As Theodore Zeldin has pointed out,
"if his books are read with care, it will be seen that they contain con-
tradictions on nearly every subject."9 Thus, an artistic eclecticism
would fully fit his reign; indeed, one would not be surprised by a pre-
monition of postmodernism.
Moreover, Louis Duc's courtroom shares the aesthetic of the arti-
facts reproduced in the Philadelphia Museum of Art catalogue, what I
would describe as an ornamental, almost baroque, neoclassicism. The
aesthetic link between Duc's courtroom and the sugar bowls and
other objects displayed in the Philadelphia exhibition is unmistakable.
That very link poses a problem for Taylor and the way she frames the
problematic of her book, for Taylor has located the courtroom entirely
in the context of legal ideology while it is clear that the aesthetic rep-
resented by the courtroom is not confined to legal institutional set-
tings. To the extent Duc's design is decipherable, or as Taylor puts it,
"legible," she sees its meaning as deriving from the debates about the
criminal justice system in France. Taylor analyzes the west wing of the
Palais de Justice too exclusively in terms of the social dynamics of
French criminal procedure. Although she attempts to underline its
theatrical aspect, she shows little interest in the nineteenth-century
French stage. Thus, the grands spectacles of the Opera do not play a
large part in her study. And the obvious comparisons between the
west wing of the Palais de Justice and the Opera, with its self-con-
scious luxuriousness, play little part in Taylor's book-even though
the Opera would help to provide an answer for the move back
towards an ornate aesthetic. 10
Having set up her question in terms of the return to "rich decora-
tion," Taylor refocuses the attention of her reader on the textual/
iconic split and states that "the schema that text replaces icon does not
fit the modernization of French justice during the Revolution and the
Napoleonic Empire when one turns from law and its basis in king or
code to courtroom procedure."" As she explains, the change in the
criminal courts was "from written, secret proceedings to emphasis on
publicity,"' 2 represented by two allegories of Justice in different wings
of the Palais de Justice: an eighteenth-century statue of Justice holding
An open book, its pages facing the viewer, and a nineteenth-century
Justice casting her ballot in an urn to reflect the balloting by the juries
9. THEODORE ZELDIN, FRANCE 1848-1945: POLITICS AND ANGER 145 (1979).
10. On the Opera's self-conscious luxuriousness, see FRPDtRIQUE PATUREAU, LE PALAIS
GARNIER DANS LA SOCIpTIr PARISINNE, 1875-1914 (1991).
11. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at xviii-xix.
12. Id. at xix.
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in the criminal courtroom. As Taylor explains, "modem French jus-
tice instituted two kinds of publicity, one doctrinal-the text of the
codes, available to a reading public-and one procedural-the oral
trial open to the public."13 She explains that these two forms of public
access to the judicial system "separated in practice over the course of
the 19th century," and exactly this separation proved decisive "for
construing architecture as the framework for practice: the building as
a neutral setting for the work of internal meditation prompted by
texts, or as a theater for the social activity in which architecture inter-
acts with the institutions to shape its meaning."14
Taylor uses this introduction to launch into a masterfully rendered
discussion of the theatrical dynamics of the mid-nineteenth-century
French criminal courtroom, but she might have dwelled just a little
longer over the suggestive fragments with which she opens her book.
She moves, for example, a bit too quickly from the text-icon polarity
with which she starts her book to the text-oral polarity that will
become central to the book as it develops, as if they captured the
same opposition. The lit de justice, representing the authority of the
king, and the ballot of the lay jury shared certain traits. Taylor might
have pointed to their embodiment of subjective authority in opposi-
tion to the written word. However, the written word should not auto-
matically be equated with an image of law as objective and eternal.
Writing is often narrative and historical, representing the changing
and the developmental. Even when writing attempts to codify justice,
the very fact that it remains frozen in time may stand as proof of
movement, so that, for example, the very anachronism of the Roman
codes provoked French Renaissance jurists to explain historical
change.1 5 Ultimately, Taylor's substitution of orality for the iconic
blurs the obvious differences between the clear hierarchy that
descends from the lit de justice and the complicated dynamics of Tay-
lor's nineteenth-century courtroom.
In her hurry to distinguish the eighteenth-century statue depicting
Justice with book in hand, and the nineteenth-century allegory of Jus-
tice casting a ballot, Taylor seems to pass over the striking resem-
blance between the two idealized, classically robed statues. Although
the ballot and the urn are meant to signify the participation of the lay
jury in the process of justice, the jurors are nowhere in sight. Instead,
a reified image of Justice communicates the same rectitude and clarity
that seems to be represented by the code-carrying figure in a vestibule
of the Cour d'appel.
13. Id. at xix-xx.
14. Id. at xx.
15. On this point, see DONALD KELLEY, Jurisprudence in the French Manner, in THE HuMAN
MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 187-208 (1990).
[Vol. 6:181
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Taylor claims that her book "focuses on conflicts over the locus of
authority to judge in post-Revolutionary France."16 And indeed, her
study examines the dynamics of power in the courtroom. However,
judging the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant should not be
identified with the power to forge the law itself. American law stu-
dents learn early in their studies that juries decide issues of fact and
judges define the law within which the juries must operate. While
French judges do not have quite the common-law role of their Ameri-
can counterparts, it must be remembered that the French king had
represented the source of law at the same time that he was the final
judge. But Taylor focuses only on the power to judge. By concentrat-
ing on the jury, Taylor ignores the power to make law. Juries can, of
course, change the law by consistently refusing to convict defendants
of certain crimes. As Taylor notes, the jury and the public "were
notorious for not cooperating with the magistrature-for insisting on
their own sovereignty, even for contravening the code."' 7 However,
the legislative function is removed from the theater of criminal justice
described by Taylor. The complicated battles over legislative sover-
eignty in the Second Empire, which ultimately play a part in the narra-
tive about the authority to judge, should have received more attention
in Taylor's story.
The core parts of Taylor's book are devoted to two major events in
the early life of the west wing of the Palais de Justice. The first of
these events occurred in October 1868 with the inauguration of the
Cour d'assizes, or the criminal wing, when "in lieu of ceremonies, the
government held a week-long open house, opening even the back
stage dependencies, inviting comment.""8 The second event was the
first sensational murder trial held in the new west wing, the trial of
Jean-Baptiste Troppmann, which took place in late December 1869.
In her study of the Palais de Justice, Taylor reverses the chronology
and begins with the "poor Alsatian mechanic" accused of single-
handedly murdering an entire family. She then turns to the inaugura-
tion that had taken place the year before-only at that point analyzing
the critical reaction to the wing designed by Louis Duc. This strategy
works perfectly because Taylor uses the Troppmann trial as a vehicle
to describe the theatrical dynamics of the French criminal courtroom
in action, telling her reader what the French populace of the 1860s
already knew about the functioning of the French courtroom before
turning to how Duc's architectural effort departed from these expecta-
tions. Indeed, Taylor moves very quickly from a description of the
crime and the bodies of the victims on public display at the Paris
16. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at xxii.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id. at 75.
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morgue to an examination of the criminal justice system at work in the
courtroom.
For Taylor, one of the central characteristics of criminal justice in
mid-nineteenth-century France was its compromise between an
inquisitorial model of justice, in which the defendant is interrogated
by a representative of governmental authority, and an accusatorial
model, which "entails an oral duel in public between the accuser and
the accused."'19 Taylor explains that the inquisitorial model of the
prerevolutionary criminal justice system remained the model for the
pretrial investigation: "At the request of the public prosecutor, an
examining magistrate questioned the suspect in private without a law-
yer, assembled a dossier of evidence and witness depositions, and
decided whether to propose the case for trial, where the prosecutor
would take over."' 20 By comparison, the courtroom provided "a sud-
den release of the defendant into a relatively balanced contest with
the public prosecutor. ' 21 For Taylor, however, the "compromise" of
the two models was not merely represented by the stages of a criminal
trial. Rather, both models appear in the courtroom itself.
In her discussion of the two models, Taylor links the inquisitorial to
the written and the accusatorial to the oral. She sees one as a "trial
based on the reading of documents, presented and judged by experts"
and the other as based on oral testimony, which, "because it re-
presents events on the spot to an uninformed lay audience, tends to be
agonistic and experiential."'22 Because of its public setting, the oral
slides into the theatrical: "The architectural effect of oral procedure is
to convert the courtroom to a stage, in which space, sight lines and
acoustics are critical. 23 It is at this point that Taylor describes the
courtroom: the defendant directly across from the jury rather than the
prosecution; the presiding judge at one end of the courtroom; an
enclosure called the barreau at the center of the room where the wit-
nesses sat along with members of the press and attorneys who had
come to the trial as spectators; and, finally, two sections of public seat-
ing differentiated by class, the reserved section close to the barreau
and a public section behind it and farthest removed from the presiding
judge.
To underscore her interpretation of the courtroom as a stage, Taylor
quotes Jean Cruppi, a French magistrate:
The clinic of a theater, rather than a hospital, this courtroom fos-
ters the striking of 'attitudes' by virtue of the handsome distances
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 10.
[Vol. 6:181
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the architect has arranged between the actors. This milieu, this
atmosphere, imposes on the personages who will arrive on the
brilliant stage from its many entrances, something of the attitude
of artists ready to play a role, and already bearing the heat of
public scrutiny.24
With its references to the floor plan of the courtroom, the passage
from Cruppi is wonderful. But it raises important questions about
what it means for there to be such self-consciousness about the court
as theater.
To exemplify the criminal trial as an oral battle, Taylor uses a work
by Daumier depicting a black-frocked lawyer, his mouth wide open in
oration and his arm stretched out pointing to his adversary. The exag-
gerated gesture is almost identical to that in one of the lithographs
from Daumier's 1840s series, "Lawyers and Justice," which bears the
caption: "A lawyer who is evidently profoundly convinced ... that his
client will pay him well." As this caption-and so many others in
"Lawyers and Justice"-makes clear, the public was in on the joke.
Everyone knew that the impassioned eloquence of the lawyer in the
courtroom was little more than playacting. Thus, although the meta-
phor of theatpr is used by Taylor, as well as by other historians of
criminal justice,25 to describe the sensory impact on the public and the
dramatic qualities of the public procedure, the fact that contemporary
audiences recognized the artificiality of the courtroom drama is not
fully explored. Although Taylor has uncovered some very self-con-
scious articulations of the trial-as-theater, such as the passage from
Cruppi, her theater has more to do with ritual than with the grands
spectacles that entertained crowds at the Opera. Indeed, the word
"ritual" appears numerous times in Taylor's text. Taylor is quite con-
scious of the trial-as-entertainment, mentioning the rush for tickets
and even the hawking of refreshments in the public section of the
courtroom. And while she draws the Opera's grands spectacles into
her discussion of the west wing's audience, certain questions about the
self-consciousness of the trial's artifice should have been fore-
grounded more than they are in her study.
In part, those questions emerge because Taylor's depiction of the
choreography and the stock characters of the nineteenth-century
French criminal courtroom is so convincingly and colorfully rendered.
Her chapter on the "trial personae" is masterful, beginning with the
air of expectancy at the start of a performance: "With spectators
installed, those with professional roles in the trial began to arrive,
24. Id. at 13.
25. See, e.g., Steven Wilf, Imagining Justice: Aesthetics and Public Executions in Late
Eighteenth-Century England, 5 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 51 (1993).
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through that array of specialized staircases and entrances from the
backstage dependencies .... 26
Rather than bringing the reader straight to the action of the trial
begun with the "usher's rap" and the cry "La cour, messieurs!"'27-
suggesting the three sharp staff raps on the French stage-Taylor ana-
lyzes the entrance of the players from their designated points of
entrance:
Most striking is the distinction between the entrances for the
magistrates and for the lawyers, since this ceremonial difference
announced and symbolized the difference in status and style
between the two sides of the case. Lawyers entered from the
public or west end of the courtroom, but arrived from a private
stairway tucked away to the side of the courtroom's public doors,
and traversed a private passageway lining one side of the wit-
nesses' enclosure to reach their own bench below the dock in the
barreau.28
By comparison, not only did the magistrates arrive announced by the
usher's rap and cry, but they arrived in red robes trimmed with white
rather than the black robes of the lawyers. "These red robes," Taylor
explains, "were not merely more splendid than the black garb of law-
yers, they literally signified royal authority, for traditionally high-
ranking magistrates had received their red robes as hand-me-downs
from the king and wore them at the king's funeral to signify the
immortality of sovereignty.
29
Here Taylor provides some of the story behind the story. She
explains that insiders to the criminal justice system understood that
prosecutors chose the presiding judge for a trial and that their favor
was required for a judge's promotion.30 In essence, the hierarchy of
promotion was reversed from the ceremonial hierarchy of the court-
room. Unfortunately, Taylor's comments are little more than an aside
rather than a point of departure for an examination of the dissonance
between the real power structure of the Second Empire's criminal jus-
tice system and its public performance.
There is no comparable split between the politics of the jury and its
function in the courtroom. Taylor explains that the Second Empire
cut back on the Second Republic's "universal suffrage" of jury service.
The jury of the Second Empire was "dominated by petty bourgeois in
commerce, with smaller proportions of men of private means and
from the liberal professions, all of whom local government officials
26. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 31.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 31-33.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id. at 34.
[Vol. 6:181
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could certify as 'intelligent, ethical, supporters of law and order.'
3'
Taylor describes the session jurors being led into the judge's delibera-
tion chamber for jury selection. The jurors' names were then drawn
from an urn and could be rejected by either the prosecution or the
defense. But it was only in the courtroom, taking up their place in the
barreau, that the jurors were sworn in by a magical "ritual," trans-
forming them temporarily from "private individuals into public ser-
vants. ' 32 They were admonished, according to the jury instructions of
article 342 of the code of criminal procedure, not to assume the truth
of any fact that had been attested to by numerous witnesses. Rather,
the jurors were there to "search their consciences," so as to be able to
determine finally whether they had an "intime conviction. 3 3 Taylor
makes much of the subjectivity required of the juror. To underscore
the tie between the juror's subjective conviction and the emphasis on
the oral duel in the Second Empire courtroom, she quotes a passage
from Justice Charles Nouguier that begins with the proposition that
"[o]ral debate is the fundamental, absolute rule" and ends by pointing
to the necessity of the juror's "intime conviction. 3 a In essence, Taylor
is on her way to establishing the juror's realm of deliberation as a
theater of sense impressions. Every gesture, every inflection of the
voice of the defendant and the various witnesses was essential to the
juror's act of judging.
As Taylor describes it, the criminal procedure of the trial is divided
into three segments: the interrogation of the defendant by the presi-
dent of the court, the testimony of the witnesses, and finally, the two
attorneys meeting in an oratorical duel. Taylor tells us that the presi-
dent's interrogation "inscribed the oral proceedings to come within
the deductive logic of the dossier. ' 35 Her choice of the word
"inscribed" is, of course, determined by her argument, for the dossier
embodies the written pole of her oral/written polarity. Indeed, she
tells us that the three phases of the trial's procedure "betray the ten-
sions between professional and lay authority and written and oral pro-
cedure" that she established earlier in the book.36
The dichotomy of the oral and the written is, as I have suggested,
central to Taylor's understanding of the Palais de Justice. Early in her
analysis of the written and the oral, she refers to the work of Walter
Ong and his "observations on the phenomenological differences
between oral and literate cultures," which she finds "suggestive" for
her effort to characterize the two stages of French criminal procedure,
31. Id. at 35.
32. Id. at 37.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 38.
35. Id. at 45.
36. Id. at 44.
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the pretrial investigation and the public trial.37 In a footnote, Taylor
distinguishes her understanding of the written and the oral from
Ong's, explaining that, for Ong, one of the fundamental characteristics
of the written is its visual quality. Taylor, on the other hand, attempts
to combine the oral with the visual to create the theater of criminal
justice. The real distinction between Taylor and Ong, however, is that
Ong is not analyzing the difference between the oral and the written
in literate cultures. In the first chapter of his book, Ong explains:
"The orality centrally treated here is primary orality, that of persons
totally unfamiliar with writing."38 It is not Taylor's purpose, however,
to examine the modernization of Parisian society, to provide an urban
Peasants into Frenchmen.39
Although literacy is not an important variable in Taylor's study,
class is. She describes the division of the public seating area of the
courtroom into a "two-class system of access" and quotes a contempo-
rary observer: "The public is clearly divided: on the reserved seats
there is lace, here in back are blue handkerchiefs; up in front the scent
of heliotrope, back here, the stench of garlic sausage."' In line with
her general theme, Taylor's interest in class focuses on the public's
participation in the theater of the criminal trial. She describes the ten-
sion between the judges' desire for a silent public and a public that
responded audibly throughout the trial, and she views audience reac-
tion as a substitute for reaction from a jury admonished not to reveal
any hint of emotion during the trial.
Since the trial is theater for Taylor, it is the "role" of the public that
concerns her.4' Although she is less concerned with the public recep-
tion of trials despite the sensationalist representation of the
Troppmann trial, she is deeply interested in the public's consumption
of the trial in the courtroom, especially the demand for tickets. She
tells us that "[s]ociety overcame class and gender scruples to squeeze
among the peuple at the back of the courtroom."42 Nevertheless,
while she describes the large number of newspaper reporters crowded
into the barreau, she shows little interest in the way in which much of
Paris and France consumed the details of the trial-through newspa-
per accounts. That, however, might reverse her privileging of the oral
over the written. Admittedly, newspaper accounts would be further
broadcast by word of mouth, but perhaps that is the point: an event
like the Troppmann trial has such an overlay of oral and written filters
37. Id. at 9.
38. WALTER ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZINO OF THE WORD 6 (1982).
39. EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL FRANCE
(1976).
40. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 22.
41. Id. at 25.
42. Id. at 24.
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and involves so many different experiences that the hierarchies of
Taylor's book, as fraught with tension as they already are, should be
rethought within a larger context that provides more perspective on
the social consumption of the French criminal courtroom.
In recent years, the collective-event-as-theater has become an
important topos in the study of political and legal culture. One thinks,
for example, of John Brewer's "Theater and Counter-Theater in
Georgian Politics" or, more recently, Steven Wilf's "Imagining Jus-
tice."'43 As one reads the literature on legal or political events as thea-
ter, the words "ceremony" and "ritual" are common refrains, and it
soon becomes quite clear that the theater is a figure for the rites docu-
mented by the cultural anthropologist. Clifford Geertz's analysis of
the Javanese funeral rite, with all of its tension and disruption, has
clearly influenced Taylor's thinking.44 Taylor does not trace her intel-
lectual genealogy directly to Geertz, but ultimately, she is less con-
cerned with placing her "theater of justice" within the conventions of
the nineteenth-century French stage than she is with developing the
trial as social ritual. This explains why the Opera and its grands spec-
tacles make little more than cameo appearances in Taylor's book;
instead, Taylor repeatedly refers to "ceremony" and "ritual." But if
Taylor is doing cultural anthropology of the Second Empire, her
analysis is a compromise between Geertz's understanding of ritual as
a scene of social change and the seamless web of the functionalists
that Geertz criticizes. Taylor underscores the tensions of the court-
room, such as between orality and literacy and between lay and judi-
cial authority; however, there seems ultimately to be a good deal of
coherence to the object of her study-even the tensions become
recurring motifs. The tensions she indicates become tropes replicated
in the trial and in Duc's design.
One of these tensions she identifies is between the male and female
traiting of various aspects of criminal justice. Taylor refers to the
"association of equity with feminine susceptibility" as opposed to the
"masculine duty of repression., 45 With this in mind, she is highly per-
ceptive of the erroneous neoclassical rendering of the courtroom in a
print of the Troppmann trial and provides the following sharp obser-
vation: "By contrast to the feminized atmosphere of the jurisdiction of
impression, a popular illustrator of the Troppmann trial unconsciously
substituted the stern neoclassical courtroom evocative of male sever-
ity, graphically expressing the major criticism the new wing aroused at
43. John Brewer, Theater and Counter-Theater in Georgian Politics: The Mock Elections at
Garrat, 22 RADICAL HIsT. REV. 8 (1979-80); Wiif, supra note 25.
44. Clifford Geertz, Ritual and Social Change, in THE INrERPRETATION OF CULTURES 142-69
(1973).
45. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 66.
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the trial and at its inauguration. ''  Irning to the architecture of
Louis Duc's west wing, Taylor identifies columns of indeterminate
gender: "[T]he order defied categorization on the canonical scale from
the masculine Doric, stocky and strong, to the matronly Ionic and the
maidenly Corinthian, increasingly slender and elegant. ' 47 She contin-
ues: "Equally ambiguous were the capitals. . . these combined chaste
Doric shape with budding Corinthian foliage, confounding genders in
an image of adolescent androgyny. ' 48 "The point," Taylor explains,
is not that the facade was 'about' gender, but rather that it
appeared to employ the symbolic language of gender, with its
powerful political implications, as a means to characterize mod-
ern justice in the terms in which it was popularly and profession-
ally discussed-those of textual severity and of popular equity.49
In a further point on gender representation, Taylor compares an
allegorical painting by IUon Bonnat on the courtroom ceiling to an
earlier representation by Pierre-Paul Prud'hon of Divine Justice and
Vengeance Pursuing Crime: "[Wihere Prud'hon made his figures of
Vice and of (Assassinated) Virtue both male, Bonnat explicitly gen-
der-typed the figures in his central panel."50 One might wish here for
an iconological history of the allegory, something along the lines of
Erwin Panofsky's Hercules am Scheidewege, in which Panofsky chron-
icled representations of Hercules's choice symbolized by two Venuses
set in moral opposition. 1 Bonnat's painting aside, Taylor is convinc-
ing on the aesthetic compromise struck by Louis Duc's structure.
As Taylor describes it, the courtroom itself was an aesthetic gamble,
its gold and richness becoming the focus of much of the critical reac-
tion to Duc's building. Contemporary architectural critics and others
generally felt that the gold resulted in making the courtroom "worldly
and luxurious, insouciant of the misery of the defendant."52 Indeed,
the materials Taylor cites in the debate over the courtroom's sumptu-
ousness fit directly into the thematics of her study; their language is
evocative of the lines she has carefully established. But if the criticism
did indeed focus as uniformly as she suggests on the golden sumptu-
ousness of Duc's revived French Renaissance style, then it is question-
able whether Duc's choices were representative of the legal culture of
the Second Empire-even with all of its ambiguities. In the face of
contemporary criticism, Taylor attempts to shore up the representa-
46. Id. at 67.
47. Id. at 77.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 93.
51. ERWIN PANOFSKY, HERCULES AM SCHEIDEWEGE UND ANDERE ANTIKE BILDsroFFE IN
DER NEUEREN KUNST (1930).
52. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 95.
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tiveness of Louis Duc's structure. In answer to the question of
whether the richness of the courtroom was the result of Duc's per-
sonal whims rather than an expression of current legal ideology, Tay-
lor is quick to point out that "the host of review committees to which
the architect answered-architectural, artistic, political, financial, and
in Duc's case, judicial-carried significant power and commented,
sometimes antagonistically and definitively on matters of character."53
Given the seemingly uniform reaction to the gilt splendor of Duc's
interior, that argument cannot dislodge the impression that the Palais
de Justice upset popular expectations about what a criminal court-
room should look like.
Yet, while it is ultimately unclear whether Duc's courtroom con-
formed to the judicial theology of his day, it is also true that even
dramatic challenges to expectations-including those which, unlike
Duc's west wing, were not officially sanctioned-must be read inside
the culture that produced them. In the end, such challenges must be
culturally explained every bit as much as cultural artifacts closer to the
aesthetic expectations of the culture. And this Taylor has indeed
attempted to do.
Whether or not all of her explanations finally convince, the range of
Taylor's themes and the intellectual energy of her book are impres-
sive. Particularly impressive is her matching of the criminal procedure
of nineteenth-century France with the aesthetic values of Louis Duc's
courtroom and the reports of the Troppmann trial. On the first page
of Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism, Rudolf Wittkower
voices his belief that in contrast to nineteenth-century architecture,
Renaissance architecture "was based on a hierarchy of values culmi-
nating in the absolute values of sacred architecture."54 If the values of
nineteenth-century architecture have nothing to do with harmonic
proportion, it remains nevertheless true that the nineteenth century
had its own values of sacred architecture. And Taylor has provided us
with a provocative guide to some of those values as well as to their
internal tensions.
53. Id. at 103.
54. RUDOLF WITrKOWER, ARCHITECTURAL PRINCIPLES IN THE AGE OF HUMANISM 1 (1949).
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